US President Donald Trump’s threat to impose a 25% tariff on countries trading with Iran has largely symbolic and psychological significance rather than real economic impact. A close reading of the White House executive order shows no explicit mention of a 25% tariff, referring only to “additional tariffs,” and limits its scope to countries that purchase goods or services from Iran, not those exporting to it.
An analysis of Iran’s main trading partners—China, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, and Turkey—indicates that U.S. leverage is limited.
China:
China, importing approximately USD 12.311 billion worth of goods from Iran and accounting for 25.78% of Iran’s total non-oil exports, is Iran’s largest trading partner. Iran’s main exports to China include crude oil and petroleum products, petrochemicals, and mineral products such as iron ore and copper. Iran is also considered one of the important suppliers of petrochemical products to the Chinese market.
Recent months have shown, however, that Trump’s room for maneuver against China is limited. The intense tariff war between Washington and Beijing, which began on April 2, 2025, and escalated to tariffs of 145 percent imposed by the United States and 125 percent by China, ultimately led to mutual retreat. The reduction of tariffs, agreements on certain trade issues, and even announcements of a potential meeting between the two countries’ presidents demonstrated that the United States cannot sustain an all-out economic confrontation with China.
Under these circumstances, it seems unlikely that the U.S. would want—or be able—to re-enter a costly dispute with its largest economic rival under the pretext of China’s trade with Iran.
Iraq
Iraq, importing USD 10.176 billion worth of goods from Iran and accounting for 21.31% of Iran’s non-oil exports, is Iran’s second-largest export destination. Iranian exports to Iraq mainly include agricultural products, foodstuffs, industrial and construction goods, and household appliances.
According to Mohammad Lahouti, head of the Export Commission of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, Iraqi banks are already operating under the impact of sanctions and are effectively unable to make official foreign-currency payments to Iranian exporters. As a result, Iraqi importers obtain the required currency from the free market—a process that operates outside formal banking frameworks and is essentially difficult to monitor.
Consequently, Iran–Iraq trade has long been conducted in an informal space and is unlikely to be affected by the new U.S. tariff policy.
United Arab Emirates:
The most challenging aspect of this policy concerns the United Arab Emirates. The UAE imports USD 5.961 billion worth of goods from Iran, accounting for about 12.48 % of Iran’s non-oil exports.
However, most of these exports are not intended for domestic consumption in the UAE. Rather, the country acts as a commercial hub and re-export center, with Iranian goods being shipped onward to other destinations.
Even if the United States were to use this as a pretext to impose tariffs on UAE exports to the U.S., it should be noted that the volume of the UAE’s direct exports to the United States is not particularly large. According to available data, UAE exports to the U.S. in 2023 amounted to around USD 3.9 billion, meaning that a 25 percent tariff would not pose a serious threat to the Emirati economy.
Afghanistan:
Afghanistan, importing USD 1.973 billion worth of goods from Iran and accounting for 4.13% of Iran’s non-oil exports, is another important trading partner. A significant portion of this trade is conducted using the Iranian rial or informal mechanisms, making U.S. tariff pressure practically ineffective along this route.
Another key point is that Iran’s oil exports have for years been subject to the harshest sanctions and are conducted through informal networks designed to bypass restrictions. These networks operate largely outside Western oversight, and therefore the new tariff war will not have a noticeable impact on Iran’s oil exports.
Taken together, these factors indicate that Trump’s tariff threat, at least under current conditions, functions more as a political and psychological instrument than as a practical tool to restrict Iran’s trade. Neither in the case of China, nor Iraq and Afghanistan, nor even the UAE, is there strong evidence of real effectiveness.
Accordingly, the new White House order appears to be less about changing Iran’s trade dynamics and more about reviving the “maximum pressure” narrative in the media and political arena—a narrative that past experience has shown does not necessarily lead to the economic outcomes sought by Washington.
Source: Tala.ir