As geopolitical shifts redefine global energy partnerships, the growing strategic alliance between Russia and Iran is drawing increasing international attention.
With negotiations underway for the supply of Russian gas to Iran, new opportunities—and potential challenges—are emerging for the region, including Azerbaijan. In an exclusive interview with News.Az, Professor Stanislav Tkachenko, Doctor of Economics and Professor at Saint Petersburg State University, discusses the future of Russian-Iranian energy cooperation, the long-term strategic potential of their partnership under Western sanctions, and the role Azerbaijan might play in facilitating and benefiting from regional gas flows.
- Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian recently stated that the agreement for Russian gas deliveries to Iran is prepared, with only pricing left to finalize. How could the signing of this agreement affect bilateral energy cooperation and alter the regional energy landscape?
- The announcement that Russia and Iran had finalized an agreement on gas deliveries was made nearly two weeks ago and has already sparked wide discussion in Russia and beyond. Our two nations possess the world’s largest reserves of natural gas, so cooperation between them is not only logical but essential. In recent months, Iran has established a free trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and signed a historic Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement with Russia. Now it’s time to implement those agreements with concrete action—and energy, especially natural gas, is a clear priority.
On one hand, gas is a cornerstone of Russia’s energy sector. Our national energy companies, including LNG exporters and electricity producers, are eager to expand their operations into the Iranian market. Iran’s annual gas production has already reached 250 billion cubic meters, but domestic and export demand still exceeds supply. Here, Russia can play a key role: by providing technology for gas exploration, production, and liquefaction, and by delivering gas to Iran’s northern regions, which suffer shortages due to most production being concentrated in the south near the Persian Gulf. However, there’s a challenge. Iran historically keeps energy prices very low as a way to address social issues and curb inflation.
This means that any Russian entry into the Iranian market must be preceded by a careful analysis of its return on investment. On the other hand, Iran’s strategic geographic position makes it a potential transit hub for Russian gas that can no longer be sold to Europe. If new pipelines are constructed and demand secured, Russia could theoretically supply over 100 billion cubic meters of gas to Asian markets. Countries like India and Pakistan have growing energy needs, though current geopolitical tensions limit practical progress on such projects.
- How promising is the strategic partnership between Russia and Iran under ongoing Western sanctions and pressure?
- Russia is prioritizing relationships with nations it sees as genuinely sovereign—those that can make independent decisions in domestic and foreign policy and resist pressure from the collective West. Iran fully meets these criteria, and Russian diplomacy regards it as a privileged economic partner. Russia has developed an effective strategy to counter financial, sectoral, and personal sanctions imposed by the West. Our economy has grown in 2023 and 2024, supporting both the military operation in Ukraine and the modernization of key industries. We’re sharing this experience with Iran.
Russia also has a vested interest in maintaining Iran as a major regional power in West Asia. That’s why we’re extending diplomatic and logistical support to Tehran amid its growing confrontation with Israel and its Western backers. Our partnership has significant long-term potential, which will likely be fully realized after the conclusion of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine. For now, both sides are studying each other’s systems and working to remove key obstacles, such as barriers to financial transactions, transport infrastructure gaps—especially across the Caspian Sea—and the completion of the Astara–Rasht–Qazvin railway, linking Russia and Azerbaijan to Iran. In the past three years, bilateral trade and tourism between Russia and Iran have grown rapidly.
- What benefits might Azerbaijan gain from the delivery of Russian gas to Iran? Are there new formats of transit, exchange, or cooperation that could emerge within the regional gas infrastructure?
- Since pricing and volume terms of the gas deal are still under negotiation, it’s too early to make firm predictions. However, we can draw lessons from Russia’s long and complicated experience with Turkey. Initially, Moscow underestimated Ankara’s intent to leverage its position as a NATO member and use discounted Russian gas to become a major LNG player. Russia wasn’t prepared to subsidize this strategy, which is why the Turkish gas hub project has stalled. Russia wants to avoid repeating that scenario with Iran. Theoretically, we can envision a situation in which large volumes of Russian gas—perhaps 100 to 150 billion cubic meters annually—are transported through Azerbaijan via existing and future pipelines to northern Iran, Pakistan, and India. Growing gas demand in East African nations might also be met with Russian gas liquefied in Iran and shipped to customers in South Asia and Africa.
In this context, Azerbaijan’s most immediate role would be in transport and logistics—a key part of the emerging energy corridor. Additionally, a promising though still distant area of cooperation is tripartite industrial collaboration between Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia in gas-based manufacturing. Russia’s Amur Gas Chemical Complex, for example, processes natural gas into polyethylene, propylene, and other products. This model could be adapted for regional development. While Russia is making significant advances in gas-chemistry, both Iran and Azerbaijan are relatively underdeveloped in this sector. Therefore, long-term cooperation among the three countries could include the development of a regional petrochemical industry—with strong potential over the coming decades.